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Abstract
We propose a criterion for discrimination against a specified sensitive attribute in su-
pervised learning, where the goal is to predict some target based on available features.
Assuming data about the predictor, target, and membership in the protected group are avail-
able, we show how to optimally adjust any learned predictor so as to remove discrimination
according to our definition. Our framework also improves incentives by shifting the cost of
poor classification from disadvantaged groups to the decision maker, who can respond by
improving the classification accuracy.
In line with other studies, our notion is oblivious: it depends only on the joint statistics of
the predictor, the target and the protected attribute, but not on interpretation of individual
features. We study the inherent limits of defining and identifying biases based on such
oblivious measures, outlining what can and cannot be inferred from different oblivious tests.
We illustrate our notion using a case study of FICO credit scores.
1 Introduction
As machine learning increasingly affects decisions in domains protected by anti-discrimination
law, there is much interest in algorithmically measuring and ensuring fairness in machine
learning. In domains such as advertising, credit, employment, education, and criminal justice,
machine learning could help obtain more accurate predictions, but its effect on existing biases
is not well understood. Although reliance on data and quantitative measures can help quantify
and eliminate existing biases, some scholars caution that algorithms can also introduce new
biases or perpetuate existing ones [BS16]. In May 2014, the Obama Administration’s Big Data
Working Group released a report [PPM+14] arguing that discrimination can sometimes “be the
inadvertent outcome of the way big data technologies are structured and used” and pointed
toward “the potential of encoding discrimination in automated decisions”. A subsequent White
House report [Whi16] calls for “equal opportunity by design” as a guiding principle in domains
such as credit scoring.
Despite the demand, a vetted methodology for avoiding discrimination against protected
attributes in machine learning is lacking. A naïve approach might require that the algorithm
should ignore all protected attributes such as race, color, religion, gender, disability, or family
status. However, this idea of “fairness through unawareness” is ineffective due to the existence
of redundant encodings, ways of predicting protected attributes from other features [PRT08].
Another common conception of non-discrimination is demographic parity. Demographic
parity requires that a decision—such as accepting or denying a loan application—be independent
of the protected attribute. In the case of a binary decision Ŷ ∈ {0,1} and a binary protected
attribute A ∈ {0,1}, this constraint can be formalized by asking that Pr{Ŷ = 1 | A = 0} = Pr{Ŷ =
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1 | A = 1}. In other words, membership in a protected class should have no correlation with
the decision. Through its various equivalent formalizations this idea appears in numerous
papers. Unfortunately, as was already argued by Dwork et al. [DHP+12], the notion is seriously
flawed on two counts. First, it doesn’t ensure fairness. Indeed, the notion permits that we
accept qualified applicants in the demographic A = 0, but unqualified individuals in A = 1, so
long as the percentages of acceptance match. This behavior can arise naturally, when there is
little or no training data available within A = 1. Second, demographic parity often cripples the
utility that we might hope to achieve. Just imagine the common scenario in which the target
variable Y—whether an individual actually defaults or not—is correlated with A. Demographic
parity would not allow the ideal predictor Ŷ = Y ,which can hardly be considered discriminatory
as it represents the actual outcome. As a result, the loss in utility of introducing demographic
parity can be substantial.
In this paper, we consider non-discrimination from the perspective of supervised learning,
where the goal is to predict a true outcome Y from features X based on labeled training data,
while ensuring they are “non-discriminatory” with respect to a specified protected attribute A.
As in the usual supervised learning setting, we assume that we have access to labeled training
data, in our case indicating also the protected attribute A. That is, to samples from the joint
distribution of (X,A,Y ). This data is used to construct a predictor Ŷ (X) or Ŷ (X,A), and we also
use such data to test whether it is unfairly discriminatory.
Unlike demographic parity, our notion always allows for the perfectly accurate solution
of Ŷ = Y . More broadly, our criterion is easier to achieve the more accurate the predictor Ŷ
is, aligning fairness with the central goal in supervised learning of building more accurate
predictors.
The notion we propose is “oblivious”, in that it is based only on the joint distribution, or joint
statistics, of the true target Y , the predictions Ŷ , and the protected attribute A. In particular, it
does not evaluate the features in X nor the functional form of the predictor Ŷ (X) nor how it was
derived. This matches other tests recently proposed and conducted, including demographic
parity and different analyses of common risk scores. In many cases, only oblivious analysis is
possible as the functional form of the score and underlying training data are not public. The only
information about the score is the score itself, which can then be correlated with the target and
protected attribute. Furthermore, even if the features or the functional form are available, going
beyond oblivious analysis essentially requires subjective interpretation or casual assumptions
about specific features, which we aim to avoid.
1.1 Summary of our contributions
We propose a simple, interpretable, and actionable framework for measuring and removing
discrimination based on protected attributes. We argue that, unlike demographic parity, our
framework provides a meaningful measure of discrimination, while demonstrating in theory
and experiment that we also achieve much higher utility. Our key contributions are as follows:
• We propose an easily checkable and interpretable notion of avoiding discrimination
based on protected attributes. Our notion enjoys a natural interpretation in terms of
graphical dependency models. It can also be viewed as shifting the burden of uncertainty
in classification from the protected class to the decision maker. In doing so, our notion
helps to incentivize the collection of better features, that depend more directly on the
target rather then the protected attribute, and of data that allows better prediction for all
protected classes.
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• We give a simple and effective framework for constructing classifiers satisfying our cri-
terion from an arbitrary learned predictor. Rather than changing a possibly complex
training pipeline, the result follows via a simple post-processing step that minimizes the
loss in utility.
• We show that the Bayes optimal non-discriminating (according to our definition) classifier
is the classifier derived from any Bayes optimal (not necessarily non-discriminating)
regressor using our post-processing step. Moreover, we quantify the loss that follows from
imposing our non-discrimination condition in case the score we start from deviates from
Bayesian optimality. This result helps to justify the approach of deriving a fair classifier
via post-processing rather than changing the original training process.
• We capture the inherent limitations of our approach, as well as any other oblivious ap-
proach, through a non-identifiability result showing that different dependency structures
with possibly different intuitive notions of fairness cannot be separated based on any
oblivious notion or test.
Throughout our work, we assume a source distribution over (Y ,X,A), where Y is the target
or true outcome (e.g. “default on loan”), X are the available features, and A is the protected
attribute. Generally, the features X may be an arbitrary vector or an abstract object, such as an
image. Our work does not refer to the particular form X has.
The objective of supervised learning is to construct a (possibly randomized) predictor
Ŷ = f (X,A) that predicts Y as is typically measured through a loss function. Furthermore, we
would like to require that Ŷ does not discriminate with respect to A, and the goal of this paper is
to formalize this notion.
2 Equalized odds and equal opportunity
We now formally introduce our first criterion.
Definition 2.1 (Equalized odds). We say that a predictor Ŷ satisfies equalized odds with respect
to protected attribute A and outcome Y , if Ŷ and A are independent conditional on Y .
Unlike demographic parity, equalized odds allows Ŷ to depend on A but only through the
target variable Y . As such, the definition encourages the use of features that allow to directly
predict Y , but prohibits abusing A as a proxy for Y .
As stated, equalized odds applies to targets and protected attributes taking values in any
space, including binary, multi-class, continuous or structured settings. The case of binary
random variables Y , Ŷ and A is of central importance in many applications, encompassing the
main conceptual and technical challenges. As a result, we focus most of our attention on this
case, in which case equalized odds are equivalent to:
Pr
{
Ŷ = 1 | A = 0,Y = y
}
= Pr
{
Ŷ = 1 | A = 1,Y = y
}
, y ∈ {0,1}
For the outcome y = 1, the constraint requires that Ŷ has equal true positive rates across the
two demographics A = 0 and A = 1. For y = 0, the constraint equalizes false positive rates. The
definition aligns nicely with the central goal of building highly accurate classifiers, since Ŷ = Y
is always an acceptable solution. However, equalized odds enforces that the accuracy is equally
high in all demographics, punishing models that perform well only on the majority.
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2.1 Equal opportunity
In the binary case, we often think of the outcome Y = 1 as the “advantaged” outcome, such
as “not defaulting on a loan”, “admission to a college” or “receiving a promotion”. A possible
relaxation of equalized odds is to require non-discrimination only within the “advantaged” out-
come group. That is, to require that people who pay back their loan, have an equal opportunity
of getting the loan in the first place (without specifying any requirement for those that will
ultimately default). This leads to a relaxation of our notion that we call “equal opportunity”.
Definition 2.2 (Equal opportunity). We say that a binary predictor Ŷ satisfies equal opportunity
with respect to A and Y if Pr
{
Ŷ = 1 | A = 0,Y = 1
}
= Pr
{
Ŷ = 1 | A = 1,Y = 1
}
.
Equal opportunity is a weaker, though still interesting, notion of non-discrimination, and
thus typically allows for stronger utility as we shall see in our case study.
2.2 Real-valued scores
Even if the target is binary, a real-valued predictive score R = f (X,A) is often used (e.g. FICO
scores for predicting loan default), with the interpretation that higher values of R correspond to
greater likelihood of Y = 1 and thus a bias toward predicting Ŷ = 1. A binary classifier Ŷ can
be obtained by thresholding the score, i.e. setting Ŷ = I{R > t} for some threshold t. Varying
this threshold changes the trade-off between sensitivity (true positive rate) and specificity (true
negative rate).
Our definition for equalized odds can be applied also to such score functions: a score R
satisfies equalized odds if R is independent of A given Y . If a score obeys equalized odds, then
any thresholding Ŷ = I{R > t} of it also obeys equalized odds (as does any other predictor derived
from R alone).
In Section 4, we will consider scores that might not satisfy equalized odds, and see how
equalized odds predictors can be derived from them and the protected attribute A, by using
different (possibly randomized) thresholds depending on the value of A. The same is possible
for equality of opportunity without the need for randomized thresholds.
2.3 Oblivious measures
As stated before, our notions of non-discrimination are oblivious in the following formal sense.
Definition 2.3. A property of a predictor Ŷ or score R is said to be oblivious if it only depends
on the joint distribution of (Y ,A, Ŷ ) or (Y ,A,R), respectively.
As a consequence of being oblivious, all the information we need to verify our definitions is
contained in the joint distribution of predictor, protected group and outcome, (Ŷ ,A,Y ). In the
binary case, when A and Y are reasonably well balanced, the joint distribution of (Ŷ ,A,Y ) is
determined by 8 parameters that can be estimated to very high accuracy from samples. We will
therefore ignore the effect of finite sample perturbations and instead assume that we know the
joint distribution of (Ŷ ,A,Y ).
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3 Comparison with related work
There is much work on this topic in the social sciences and legal scholarship; we point the reader
to Barocas and Selbst [BS16] for an excellent entry point to this rich literature. See also the survey
by Romei and Ruggieri [RR14], and the references at http://www.fatml.org/resources.html.
In its various equivalent notions, demographic parity appears in many papers, such as [CKP09,
Zli15, BZVGRG15] to name a few. Zemel et al. [ZWS+13] propose an interesting way of achiev-
ing demographic parity by aiming to learn a representation of the data that is independent of
the protected attribute, while retaining as much information about the features X as possible.
Louizos et al. [LSL+15] extend on this approach with deep variational auto-encoders. Feldman
et al. [FFM+15] propose a formalization of “limiting disparate impact”. For binary classifiers,
the condition states that Pr
{
Ŷ = 1 | A = 0
}
6 0.8 ·Pr
{
Ŷ = 1 | A = 1
}
. The authors argue that this
corresponds to the “80% rule” in the legal literature. The notion differs from demographic
parity mainly in that it compares the probabilities as a ratio rather than additively, and in that it
allows a one-sided violation of the constraint.
While simple and seemingly intuitive, demographic parity has serious conceptual limitations
as a fairness notion, many of which were pointed out in work of Dwork et al. [DHP+12]. In
our experiments, we will see that demographic parity also falls short on utility. Dwork et
al. [DHP+12] argue that a sound notion of fairness must be task-specific, and formalize fairness
based on a hypothetical similarity measure d(x,x′) requiring similar individuals to receive a
similar distribution over outcomes. In practice, however, in can be difficult to come up with a
suitable metric. Our notion is task-specific in the sense that it makes critical use of the final
outcome Y , while avoiding the difficulty of dealing with the features X.
In a recent concurrent work, Kleinberg, Mullainathan and Raghavan [KMR16] showed that
in general a score that is calibrated within each group does not satisfy a criterion equivalent to
equalized odds for binary predictors. This result highlights that calibration alone does not
imply non-discrimination according to our measure. Conversely, achieving equalized odds may
in general compromise other desirable properties of a score.
Early work of Pedreshi et al. [PRT08] and several follow-up works explore a logical rule-
based approach to non-discrimination. These approaches don’t easily relate to our statistical
approach.
4 Achieving equalized odds and equality of opportunity
We now explain how to find an equalized odds or equal opportunity predictor Y˜ derived from
a, possibly discriminatory, learned binary predictor Ŷ or score R. We envision that Ŷ or R are
whatever comes out of the existing training pipeline for the problem at hand. Importantly, we
do not require changing the training process, as this might introduce additional complexity, but
rather only a post-learning step. In particular, we will construct a non-discriminating predictor
which is derived from Ŷ or R:
Definition 4.1 (Derived predictor). A predictor Y˜ is derived from a random variable R and the
protected attribute A if it is a possibly randomized function of the random variables (R,A) alone.
In particular, Y˜ is independent of X conditional on (R,A).
The definition asks that the value of a derived predictor Y˜ should only depend on R and the
protected attribute, though it may introduce additional randomness. But the formulation of
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Y˜ (that is, the function applied to the values of R and A), depends on information about the
joint distribution of (R,A,Y ). In other words, this joint distribution (or an empirical estimate of
it) is required at training time in order to construct the predictor Y˜ , but at prediction time we
only have access to values of (R,A). No further data about the underlying features X, nor their
distribution, is required.
Loss minimization. It is always easy to construct a trivial predictor satisfying equalized odds,
by making decisions independent of X,A and R. For example, using the constant predictor
Ŷ = 0 or Ŷ = 1. The goal, of course, is to obtain a good predictor satisfying the condition. To
quantify the notion of “good”, we consider a loss function ` : {0,1}2 → R that takes a pair of
labels and returns a real number `(ŷ, y) ∈ R which indicates the loss (or cost, or undesirability)
of predicting ŷ when the correct label is y. Our goal is then to design derived predictors Y˜ that
minimize the expected loss E`(Y˜ ,Y ) subject to one of our definitions.
4.1 Deriving from a binary predictor
We will first develop an intuitive geometric solution in the case where we adjust a binary
predictor Ŷ and A is a binary protected attribute The proof generalizes directly to the case of
a discrete protected attribute with more than two values. For convenience, we introduce the
notation
γa(Ŷ )
def=
(
Pr
{
Ŷ = 1 | A = a,Y = 0
}
, Pr
{
Ŷ = 1 | A = a,Y = 1
})
. (4.1)
The first component of γa(Ŷ ) is the false positive rate of Ŷ within the demographic satisfying
A = a. Similarly, the second component is the true positive rate of Ŷ within A = a. Observe that
we can calculate γa(Ŷ ) given the joint distribution of (Ŷ ,A,Y ). The definitions of equalized
odds and equal opportunity can be expressed in terms of γ(Ŷ ), as formalized in the following
straight-forward Lemma:
Lemma 4.2. A predictor Ŷ satisfies:
1. equalized odds if and only if γ0(Ŷ ) = γ1(Ŷ ), and
2. equal opportunity if and only if γ0(Ŷ ) and γ1(Ŷ ) agree in the second component, i.e., γ0(Ŷ )2 =
γ1(Ŷ )2.
For a ∈ {0,1}, consider the two-dimensional convex polytope defined as the convex hull of
four vertices:
Pa(Ŷ )
def= convhull
{
(0,0),γa(Ŷ ),γa(1− Ŷ ), (1,1)
}
(4.2)
Our next lemma shows that P0(Ŷ ) and P1(Ŷ ) characterize exactly the trade-offs between false
positives and true positives that we can achieve with any derived classifier. The polytopes are
visualized in Figure 1.
Lemma 4.3. A predictor Y˜ is derived if and only if for all a ∈ {0,1}, we have γa(Y˜ ) ∈ Pa(Ŷ ).
Proof. Since a derived predictor Y˜ can only depend on (Ŷ ,A) and these variables are binary,
the predictor Y˜ is completely described by four parameters in [0,1] corresponding to the
probabilities Pr
{
Y˜ = 1 | Ŷ = ŷ,A = a
}
for ŷ, a ∈ {0,1}. Each of these parameter choices leads to one
of the points in Pa(Ŷ ) and every point in the convex hull can be achieved by some parameter
setting.
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Result for Y˜= 1− Ŷ
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Figure 1: Finding the optimal equalized odds predictor (left), and equal opportunity predictor
(right).
Combining Lemma 4.2 with Lemma 4.3, we see that the following optimization problem
gives the optimal derived predictor with equalized odds:
min
Y˜
E`(Y˜ ,Y ) (4.3)
s.t. ∀a ∈ {0,1} : γa(Y˜ ) ∈ Pa(Ŷ ) (derived)
γ0(Y˜ ) = γ1(Y˜ ) (equalized odds)
Figure 1 gives a simple geometric picture for the solution of the linear program whose guarantees
are summarized next.
Proposition 4.4. The optimization problem (4.3) is a linear program in four variables whose coeffi-
cients can be computed from the joint distribution of (Ŷ ,A,Y ). Moreover, its solution is an optimal
equalized odds predictor derived from Ŷ and A.
Proof of Proposition 4.4. The second claim follows by combining Lemma 4.2 with Lemma 4.3.
To argue the first claim, we saw in the proof of Lemma 4.3 that a derived predictor is specified
by four parameters and the constraint region is an intersection of two-dimensional linear
constraints. It remains to show that the objective function is a linear function in these parameters.
Writing out the objective, we have
E
[
`(Y˜ ,Y )
]
=
∑
y,y′∈{0,1}
`(y,y′)Pr
{
Y˜ = y′ ,Y = y
}
.
Further,
Pr
{
Y˜ = y′ ,Y = y
}
= Pr
{
Y˜ = y′ ,Y = y | Y˜ = Ŷ
}
Pr
{
Y˜ = Ŷ
}
+ Pr
{
Y˜ = y′ ,Y = y | Y˜ , Ŷ
}
Pr
{
Y˜ , Ŷ
}
= Pr
{
Ŷ = y′ ,Y = y
}
Pr
{
Y˜ = Ŷ
}
+ Pr
{
Ŷ = 1− y′ ,Y = y
}
Pr
{
Y˜ , Ŷ
}
.
All probabilities in the last line that do not involve Y˜ can be computed from the joint distribution.
The probabilities that do involve Y˜ are each a linear function of the parameters that specify Y˜ .
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The corresponding optimization problem for equation opportunity is the same except that
it has a weaker constraint γ0(Y˜ )2 = γ1(Y˜ )2. The proof is analogous to that of Proposition 4.4.
Figure 1 explains the solution geometrically.
4.2 Deriving from a score function
We now consider deriving non-discriminating predictors from a real valued score R ∈ [0,1]. The
motivation is that in many realistic scenarios (such as FICO scores), the data are summarized
by a one-dimensional score function and a decision is made based on the score, typically by
thresholding it. Since a continuous statistic can carry more information than a binary outcome Y ,
we can hope to achieve higher utility when working with R directly, rather then with a binary
predictor Ŷ .
A “protected attribute blind” way of deriving a binary predictor fromRwould be to threshold
it, i.e. using Ŷ = I {R > t}. If R satisfied equalized odds, then so will such a predictor, and
the optimal threshold should be chosen to balance false positive and false negatives so as to
minimize the expected loss. When R does not already satisfy equalized odds, we might need to
use different thresholds for different values of A (different protected groups), i.e. Y˜ = I {R > tA}.
As we will see, even this might not be sufficient, and we might need to introduce additional
randomness as in the preceding section.
Central to our study is the ROC (Receiver Operator Characteristic) curve of the score, which
captures the false positive and true positive (equivalently, false negative) rates at different
thresholds. These are curves in a two dimensional plane, where the horizontal axes is the false
positive rate of a predictor and the vertical axes is the true positive rate. As discussed in the
previous section, equalized odds can be stated as requiring the true positive and false positive
rates, (Pr
{
Ŷ = 1 | Y = 0,A = a
}
,Pr
{
Ŷ = 1 | Y = 1,A = a
}
), agree between different values of a of
the protected attribute. That is, that for all values of the protected attribute, the conditional
behavior of the predictor is at exactly the same point in this space. We will therefor consider the
A-conditional ROC curves
Ca(t)
def=
(
Pr
{
R̂ > t | A = a,Y = 0
}
,Pr
{
R̂ > t | A = a,Y = 1
})
.
Since the ROC curves exactly specify the conditional distributions R|A,Y , a score function obeys
equalized odds if and only if the ROC curves for all values of the protected attribute agree, that
is Ca(t) = Ca′ (t) for all values of a and t. In this case, any thresholding of R yields an equalized
odds predictor (all protected groups are at the same point on the curve, and the same point in
false/true-positive plane).
When the ROC curves do not agree, we might choose different thresholds ta for the different
protected groups. This yields different points on each A-conditional ROC curve. For the
resulting predictor to satisfy equalized odds, these must be at the same point in the false/true-
positive plane. This is possible only at points where all A-conditional ROC curves intersect. But
the ROC curves might not all intersect except at the trivial endpoints, and even if they do, their
point of intersection might represent a poor tradeoff between false positive and false negatives.
As with the case of correcting a binary predictor, we can use randomization to fill the span
of possible derived predictors and allow for significant intersection in the false/true-positive
plane. In particular, for every protected group a, consider the convex hull of the image of the
conditional ROC curve:
Da
def= convhull {Ca(t) : t ∈ [0,1]} (4.4)
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Figure 2: Finding the optimal equalized odds threshold predictor (middle), and equal oppor-
tunity threshold predictor (right). For the equal opportunity predictor, within each group the
cost for a given true positive rate is proportional to the horizontal gap between the ROC curve
and the profit-maximizing tangent line (i.e., the two curves on the left plot), so it is a convex
function of the true positive rate (right). This lets us optimize it efficiently with ternary search.
The definition of Da is analogous to the polytope Pa in the previous section, except that here we
do not consider points below the main diagonal (line from (0,0) to (1,1)), which are worse than
“random guessing” and hence never desirable for any reasonable loss function.
Deriving an optimal equalized odds threshold predictor. Any point in the convex hull Da
represents the false/true positive rates, conditioned on A = a, of a randomized derived predictor
based on R. In particular, since the space is only two-dimensional, such a predictor Y˜ can always
be taken to be a mixture of two threshold predictors (corresponding to the convex hull of two
points on the ROC curve). Conditional on A = a, the predictor Y˜ behaves as
Y˜ = I {R > Ta} ,
where Ta is a randomized threshold assuming the value ta with probability pa and the value ta
with probability pa. In other words, to construct an equalized odds predictor, we should
choose a point in the intersection of these convex hulls, γ = (γ0,γ1) ∈ ∩aDa, and then for each
protected group realize the true/false-positive rates γ with a (possible randomized) predictor
Y˜ |(A = a) = I {R > Ta} resulting in the predictor Y˜ = PrI {R > TA}. For each group a, we either use
a fixed threshold Ta = ta or a mixture of two thresholds ta < ta. In the latter case, if A = a and
R < ta we always set Y˜ = 0, if R > ta we always set Y˜ = 1, but if ta < R < ta, we flip a coin and set
Y˜ = 1 with probability p
a
.
The feasible set of false/true positive rates of possible equalized odds predictors is thus the
intersection of the areas under the A-conditional ROC curves, and above the main diagonal (see
Figure 2). Since for any loss function the optimal false/true-positive rate will always be on the
upper-left boundary of this feasible set, this is effectively the ROC curve of the equalized odds
predictors. This ROC curve is the pointwise minimum of all A-conditional ROC curves. The
performance of an equalized odds predictor is thus determined by the minimum performance
among all protected groups. Said differently, requiring equalized odds incentivizes the learner
to build good predictors for all classes. For a given loss function, finding the optimal tradeoff
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amounts to optimizing (assuming w.l.o.g. `(0,0) = `(1,1) = 0):
min
∀a : γ∈Da
γ0`(1,0) + (1−γ1)`(0,1) (4.5)
This is no longer a linear program, since Da are not polytopes, or at least are not specified as
such. Nevertheless, (4.5) can be efficiently optimized numerically using ternary search.
Deriving an optimal equal opportunity threshold predictor. The construction follows the
same approach except that there is one fewer constraint. We only need to find points on the
conditional ROC curves that have the same true positive rates in both groups. Assuming
continuity of the conditional ROC curves, this means we can always find points on the boundary
of the conditional ROC curves. In this case, no randomization is necessary. The optimal solution
corresponds to two deterministic thresholds, one for each group. As before, the optimization
problem can be solved efficiently using ternary search over the target true positive value. Here
we use, as Figure 2 illustrates, that the cost of the best solution is convex as a function of its true
positive rate.
5 Bayes optimal predictors
In this section, we develop the theory a theory for non-discriminating Bayes optimal classifi-
cation. We will first show that a Bayes optimal equalized odds predictor can be obtained as
an derived threshold predictor of the Bayes optimal regressor. Second, we quantify the loss of
deriving an equalized odds predictor based on a regressor that deviates from the Bayes optimal
regressor. This can be used to justify the approach of first training classifiers without any
fairness constraint, and then deriving an equalized odds predictor in a second step.
Definition 5.1 (Bayes optimal regressor). Given random variables (X,A) and a target variable Y ,
the Bayes optimal regressor is R = argminr(x,a)E
[
(Y − r(X,A))2
]
= r∗(X,A) with r∗(x,a) = E[Y | X =
x,A = a].
The Bayes optimal classifier, for any proper loss, is then a threshold predictor of R, where
the threshold depends on the loss function (see, e.g., [Was10]). We will extend this result to
the case where we additionally ask the classifier to satisfy an oblivious property, such as our
non-discrimination properties.
Proposition 5.2. For any source distribution over (Y ,X,A) with Bayes optimal regressor R(X,A),
any loss function, and any oblivious property C, there exists a predictor Y ∗(R,A) such that:
1. Y ∗ is an optimal predictor satisfying C. That is, E`(Y ∗,Y )6 E`(Ŷ ,Y ) for any predictor Ŷ (X,A)
which satisfies C.
2. Y ∗ is derived from (R,A).
Proof. Consider an arbitrary classifier Ŷ on the attributes (X,A), defined by a (possibly random-
ized) function Ŷ = f (X,A). Given (R = r,A = a), we can draw a fresh X ′ from the distribution
(X | R = r,A = a), and set Y ∗ = f (X ′ , a). This satisfies (2). Moreover, since Y is binary with
expectation R, Y is independent of X conditioned on (R,A). Hence (Y ,X,R,A) and (Y ,X ′ ,R,A)
have identical distributions, so (Y ∗,A,Y ) and (Ŷ ,A,Y ) also have identical distributions. This
implies Y ∗ satisfies (1) as desired.
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Figure 3: Graphical model for the proof of Proposition 5.2.
Corollary 5.3 (Optimality characterization). An optimal equalized odds predictor can be derived
from the Bayes optimal regressor R and the protected attribute A. The same is true for an optimal
equal opportunity predictor.
5.1 Near optimality
We can furthermore show that if we can approximate the (unconstrained) Bayes optimal regres-
sor well enough, then we can also construct a nearly optimal non-discriminating classifier.
To state the result, we introduce the following distance measure on random variables.
Definition 5.4. We define the conditional Kolmogorov distance between two random variables
R,R′ ∈ [0,1] in the same probability space as A and Y as:
dK(R,R
′) def= max
a,y∈{0,1}
sup
t∈[0,1]
∣∣∣Pr {R > t | A = a,Y = y} −Pr {R′ > t | A = a,Y = y}∣∣∣ . (5.1)
Without the conditioning onA and Y , this definition coincides with the standard Kolmogorov
distance. Closeness in Kolmogorov distance is a rather weak requirement. We need the slightly
stronger condition that the Kolmogorov distance is small for each of the four conditionings on
A and Y . This captures the distance between the restricted ROC curves, as formalized next.
Lemma 5.5. Let R,R′ ∈ [0,1] be random variables in the same probability space as A and Y . Then,
for any point p on a restricted ROC curve of R, there is a point q on the corresponding restricted ROC
curve of R′ such that ‖p − q‖2 6
√
2 · dK (R,R′).
Proof. Assume the point p is achieved by thresholding R at t ∈ [0,1]. Let q be the point on the
ROC curve achieved by thresholding R′ at the same threshold t′ . After applying the definition
to bound the distance in each coordinate, the claim follows from Pythagoras’ theorem.
We can now show that an equalized odds predictor derived from a nearly optimal regressor
is still nearly optimal among all equal odds predictors, while quantifying the loss in terms of
the conditional Kolmogorov distance.
Theorem 5.6 (Near optimality). Assume that ` is a bounded loss function, and let R̂ ∈ [0,1] be an
arbitrary random variable. Then, there is an optimal equalized odds predictor Y ∗ and an equalized
odds predictor Ŷ derived from (R̂,A) such that
E`(Ŷ ,Y )6 E`(Y ∗,Y ) + 2
√
2 · dK(R̂,R∗) ,
where R∗ is the Bayes optimal regressor. The same claim is true for equal opportunity.
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Proof of Theorem 5.6. We prove the claim for equalized odds. The case of equal opportunity is
analogous.
Fix the loss function ` and the regressor R̂. Take Y ∗ to be the predictor derived from the
Bayes optimal regressor R∗ and A. By Corollary 5.3, we know that this is an optimal equalized
odds predictor as required by the lemma. It remains to construct a derived equalized odds
predictor Ŷ and relate its loss to that of Y ∗.
Recall the optimization problem for defining the optimal derived equalized odds predictor.
Let D̂a be the constraint region defined by R̂. Likewise, let D∗a be the constraint region under R∗.
The optimal classifier Y ∗ corresponds to a point p∗ ∈D∗0 ∩D∗1. As a consequence of Lemma 5.5,
we can find (not necessarily identical) points q0 ∈ D̂0 and q1 ∈ D̂1 such that for all a ∈ {0,1},
‖p∗ − qa‖2 6
√
2 · dK(R̂,R∗) .
We claim that this means we can also find a feasible point q ∈ D̂0 ∩ D̂1 such that
‖p∗ − q‖2 6 2 · dK(R̂,R∗) .
To see this, assume without loss of generality that the first coordinate of q1 is greater than the
first coordinate of q0, and that all points p∗,q0,q1 lie above the main diagonal. By definition
of D̂1, we know that the entire line segment L1 from (0,0) to q1 is contained in D̂1. Similarly,
the entire line segment L0 between q0 and (1,1) is contained in D̂0. Now, take q ∈ L0 ∩ L1. By
construction, q ∈ D̂0 ∩ D̂1 defines a classifier Ŷ derived from R̂ and A. Moreover,
‖p∗ − q‖22 6 ‖p∗ − q0‖22 + ‖p∗ − q0‖22 6 4 · dK(R̂,R∗)2 .
Finally, by assumption on the loss function, there is a vector v with ‖v‖2 6
√
2 such that
E`(Ŷ ,Y ) = 〈v,q〉 and E`(Y ∗,Y ) = 〈v,p∗〉. Applying Cauchy-Schwarz,
E`(Ŷ ,Y )−E`(Y ∗,Y ) = 〈v,q − p∗〉6 ‖v‖2 · ‖q − p∗‖2 6 2
√
2 · dK(R̂,R∗) .
This completes the proof.
6 Oblivious identifiability of discrimination
Before turning to analyzing data, we pause to consider to what extent “black box” oblivious
tests like ours can identify discriminatory predictions. To shed light on this issue, we introduce
two possible scenarios for the dependency structure of the score, the target and the protected
attribute. We will argue that while these two scenarios can have fundamentally different
interpretations from the point of view of fairness, they can be indistinguishable from their joint
distribution. In particular, no oblivious test can resolve which of the two scenarios applies.
YA
X1
X2
R˜R∗
Figure 4: Graphical
model for Scenario I.
Scenario I Consider the dependency structure depicted in Figure 4.
Here, X1 is a feature highly (even deterministically) correlated with
the protected attribute A, but independent of the target Y given A.
For example, X1 might be “languages spoken at home” or “great great
grandfather’s profession”. The target Y has a statistical correlation
with the protected attribute. There’s a second real-valued feature X2
correlated with Y , but only related to A through Y . For example, X2
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might capture an applicant’s driving record if applying for insurance,
financial activity if applying for a loan, or criminal history in criminal
justice situations. An intuitively “fair” predictor here is to use only
the feature X2 through the score R˜ = X2. The score R˜ satisfies equalized odds, since X2 and A
are independent conditional on Y . Because of the statistical correlation between A and Y , a
better statistical predictor, with greater power, can be obtained by taking into account also the
protected attribute A, or perhaps its surrogate X1. The statistically optimal predictor would
have the form R∗ = r∗I (X2,X1), biasing the score according to the protected attribute A. The score
R∗ does not satisfy equalized odds, and in a sense seems to be “profiling” based on A.
X3A Y
R˜ R∗
Figure 5: Graphical
model for Scenario II.
Scenario II Now consider the dependency structure depicted in
Figure 5. Here X3 is a feature, e.g. “wealth” or “annual income”,
correlated with the protected attribute A and directly predictive of
the target Y . That is, in this model, the probability of paying back
of a loan is just a function of an individual’s wealth, independent of
their race. Using X3 on its own as a predictor, e.g. using the score
R∗ = X3, does not naturally seem directly discriminatory. However,
as can be seen from the dependency structure, this score does not
satisfy equalized odds. We can correct it to satisfy equalized odds
and consider the optimal non-discriminating predictor R˜ = r˜II (X3,A)
that does satisfy equalized odds. If A and X3, and thus A and Y , are positively correlated,
then R˜ would depend inversely on A (see numerical construction below), introducing a form
of “corrective discrimination”, so as to make R˜ is independent of A given Y (as is required by
equalized odds).
6.1 Unidentifiability
The above two scenarios seem rather different. The optimal score R∗ is in one case based directly
on A or its surrogate, and in another only on a directly predictive feature, but this is not apparent
by considering the equalized odds criterion, suggesting a possible shortcoming of equalized
odds. In fact, as we will now see, the two scenarios are indistinguishable using any oblivious test.
That is, no test based only on the target labels, the protected attribute and the score would give
different indications for the optimal score R∗ in the two scenarios. If it were judged unfair in
one scenario, it would also be judged unfair in the other.
We will show this by constructing specific instantiations of the two scenarios where the joint
distributions over (Y ,A,R∗, R˜) are identical. The scenarios are thus unidentifiable based only on
these joint distributions.
We will consider binary targets and protected attributes taking values in A,Y ∈ {−1,1} and
real valued features. We deviate from our convention of {0,1}-values only to simplify the
resulting expressions. In Scenario I, let:
• Pr {A = 1} = 1/2, and X1 = A
• Y follows a logistic model parametrized based on A: Pr {Y = y | A = a} = 11+exp(−2ay) ,
• X2 is Gaussian with mean Y : X2 = Y +N (0,1)
• Optimal unconstrained and equalized odds scores are given by: R∗ = X1 +X2 = A+X2, and
R˜ = X2
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X3A Y
X1 X2
AX1 Y X2
X3
Figure 6: Two possible directed dependency structures for the variables in scenarios I and II.
The undirected (infrastructure graph) versions of both graphs are also possible.
In Scenario II, let:
• Pr {A = 1} = 1/2.
• X3 conditional on A = a is a mixture of two Gaussians: N (a+ 1,1) with weight 11+exp(−2a)
andN (a− 1,1) with weight 11+exp(2a) .
• Y follows a logistic model parametrized based on X3: Pr {Y = y | X3 = x3} = 11+exp(−2yx3) .
• Optimal unconstrained and equalized odds scores are given by: R∗ = X3, and R˜ = X3 −A
The following proposition establishes the equivalence between the scenarios and the optimality
of the scores (proof at end of section):
Proposition 6.1. The joint distributions of (Y ,A,R∗, R˜) are identical in the above two scenarios.
Moreover, R∗ and R˜ are optimal unconstrained and equalized odds scores respectively, in that their
ROC curves are optimal and for any loss function an optimal (unconstrained or equalized odds)
classifier can be derived from them by thresholding.
Not only can an oblivious test (based only on (Y ,A,R)) not distinguish between the two
scenarios, but even having access to the features is not of much help. Suppose we have access
to all three feature, i.e. to a joint distribution over (Y ,A,X1,X2,X3)—since the distributions
over (Y ,A,R∗, R˜) agree, we can construct such a joint distribution with X2 = R˜ and X3 = R˜. The
features are correlated with each other, with X3 = X1 +X2. Without attaching meaning to the
features or making causal assumptions about them, we do not gain any further insight on the
two scores. In particular, both causal structures depicted in Figure 6 are possible.
6.2 Comparison of different oblivious measures
It is interesting to consider how different oblivious measures apply to the scores R˜ and R∗ in
these two scenarios.
As discussed in Section 4.2, a score satisfies equalized odds iff the conditional ROC curves
agree for both values of A, which we refer to as having identical ROC curves.
Definition 6.2 (Identical ROC Curves). We say that a score R has identical conditional ROC
curves if Ca(t) = Ca′ (t) for all groups of a,a′ and all t ∈ R.
In particular, this property is achieved by an equalized odds score R˜. Within each protected
group, i.e. for each value A = a, the score R∗ differs from R˜ by a fixed monotone transformation,
namely an additive shift R∗ = R˜ +A. Consider a derived threshold predictor Ŷ (R˜) = I
{
R˜ > t
}
based on R˜. Any such predictor obeys equalized odds. We can also derive the same predictor
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deterministically from R∗ andA as Ŷ (R∗,A) = I {R∗ > tA}where tA = t−A. That is, in our particular
example, R∗ is special in that optimal equalized odds predictors can be derived from it (and
the protected attribute A) deterministically, without the need to introduce randomness as in
Section 4.2. In terms of the A-conditional ROC curves, this happens because the images of
the conditional ROC curves C0 and C1 overlap, making it possible to choose points in the
true/false-positive rate plane that are on both ROC curves. However, the same point on the
conditional ROC curves correspond to different thresholds! Instead of C0(t) = C1(t), for R∗ we
have C0(t) = C1(t − 1). We refer to this property as “matching” conditional ROC curves:
Definition 6.3 (Matching ROC curves). We say that a score R has matching conditional ROC
curves if the images of all A-conditional ROC curves are the same, i.e., for all groups a,a′ ,
{Ca(t) : t ∈ R} = {Ca′ (t) : t ∈ R} .
Having matching conditional ROC curves corresponds to being deterministically correctable
to be non-discriminating: If a predictor R has matching conditional ROC curves, then for any
loss function the optimal equalized odds derived predictor is a deterministic function of R and
A. But as our examples show, having matching ROC curves does not at all mean the score is
itself non-discriminatory: it can be biased according to A, and a (deterministic) correction might
be necessary in order to ensure equalized odds.
Having identical or matching ROC curves are properties of the conditional distribution
R|Y ,A, also referred to as “model errors”. Oblivious measures can also depend on the conditional
distribution Y |R,A, also referred to as “target population errors”. In particular, one might
consider the following property:
Definition 6.4 (Matching frequencies). We say that a score R has matching conditional frequencies,
if for all groups a,a′ and all scores t, we have
Pr {Y = 1 | R = t,A = a} = Pr {Y = 1 | R = t,A = a′} .
Matching conditional frequencies state that at a given score, both groups have the same
probability of being labeled positive. The definition can also be phrased as requiring that
the conditional distribution Y |R,A be independent of A. In other words, having matching
conditional frequencies is equivalent to A and Y being independent conditioned on R. The
corresponding dependency structure is Y − R −A. That is, the score R includes all possible
information the protected attribute can provide on the target Y . Indeed having matching
conditional frequencies means that the score is in a sense “optimally dependent” on the protected
attribute A. Formally, for any loss function the optimal (unconstrained, possibly discriminatory)
derived predictor Ŷ (R,A) would be a function of R alone, since R already includes all relevant
information about A. In particular, an unconstrained optimal score, like R∗ in our constructions,
would satisfy matching conditional frequencies. Having matching frequencies can therefore
be seen as a property indicating utilizing the protected attribute for optimal predictive power,
rather then protecting discrimination based on it.
It is also worth noting the similarity between matching frequencies and a binary predictor
Ŷ having equal conditional precision, that is Pr
{
Y = 1 | Ŷ = ŷ,A = a
}
= Pr
{
Y = 1 | Ŷ = ŷ,A = a′
}
.
Viewing Ŷ as a score that takes two possible values, the notions agree. But R having matching
conditional frequencies does not imply the threshold predictors Ŷ (R) = I {R > t} will have match-
ing precision—the conditional distributions R|A might be different, and these are involved in
marginalizing over R > t and R6 t.
To summarize, the properties of the scores in our scenarios are:
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• R∗ is optimal based on the features and protected attribute, without any constraints.
• R˜ is optimal among all equalized odds scores.
• R˜ does satisfy equal odds, R∗ does not satisfy equal odds.
• R˜ has identical (thus matching) ROC curves, R∗ has matching but non-identical ROC
curves.
• R∗ has matching conditional frequencies, while R˜ does not.
Proof of Proposition 6.1
First consider Scenario I. The score R˜ = X2 obeys equalized odds due to the dependency structure.
More broadly, if a score R = f (X2,X1) obeys equalized odds, for some randomized function f , it
cannot depend on X1: conditioned on Y , X2 is independent of A = X1, and so any dependency
of f on X1 would create a statistical dependency on A = X1 (still conditioned on Y ) which is
not allowed. We can verify that Pr {Y = y | X2 = x2} ∝ Pr {Y = y}Pr {X2 = x2 | Y = y} ∝ exp(2yx2)
which is monotone in X2, and so for any loss function we would just want to threshold X2 and
any function monotone in X2 would make an optimal equalized odds predictor.
To obtain the optimal unconstrained score consider
Pr {Y = y | X1 = x1,X2 = x2} ∝ Pr {A = x1}Pr {Y = y | A = x1}Pr {X2 = x2 | Y = y}
∝ exp(2y(x1 + x2)).
That is, optimal classification only depends on x1 + x2 and so R∗ = X1 +X2 is optimal.
Turning to scenario II, since P (Y |X3) is monotone in X3, any monotone function of it is
optimal (unconstrained), and the dependency structure implies its optimal even if we allow
dependence on A. Furthermore, the conditional distribution Y |X3 matched that of Y |R∗ from
scenario I since again we have Pr {Y = y|X3 = x3} ∝ exp(2yx3) by construction. Since we defined
R∗ = X3, we have that the conditionals R∗|Y match. We can also verify that by construction
X3|A matches R∗|A in scenario I. Since in scenario I, R∗ is optimal even dependent on A, we
have that A is independent of Y conditioned on R∗, as in scenario II when we condition on
X3 = R∗. This establishes the joint distribution over (A,Y ,R∗) is the same in both scenarios. Since
R˜ is the same deterministic function of A and R∗ in both scenarios, we can further conclude
the joint distributions over A,Y ,R∗ and R˜ are the same. Since equalized odds is an oblivious
property, once these distributions match, if R˜ obeys equalized odds in scenario I, it also obeys it
in scenario II.
7 Case study: FICO scores
We examine various fairness measures in the context of FICO scores with the protected attribute
of race. FICO scores are a proprietary classifier widely used in the United States to predict credit
worthiness. Our FICO data is based on a sample of 301536 TransUnion TransRisk scores from
2003 [Res07]. These scores, ranging from 300 to 850, try to predict credit risk; they form our
score R. People were labeled as in default if they failed to pay a debt for at least 90 days on at
least one account in the ensuing 18-24 month period; this gives an outcome Y . Our protected
attribute A is race, which is restricted to four values: Asian, white non-Hispanic (labeled “white”
16
in figures), Hispanic, and black. FICO scores are complicated proprietary classifiers based
on features, like number of bank accounts kept, that could interact with culture—and hence
race—in unfair ways. A credit score cutoff of 620 is commonly used for prime-rate loans1,
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Figure 7: These two marginals, and the number of people per group, constitute our input data.
which corresponds to an any-account default rate of 18%. Note that this measures default
on any account TransUnion was aware of; it corresponds to a much lower (≈ 2%) chance of
default on individual new loans. To illustrate the concepts, we use any-account default as our
target Y—a higher positive rate better illustrates the difference between equalized odds and
equal opportunity.
We therefore consider the behavior of a lender who makes money on default rates below
this, i.e., for whom whom false positives (giving loans to people that default on any account)
is 82/18 as expensive as false negatives (not giving a loan to people that don’t default). The
lender thus wants to construct a predictor Ŷ that is optimal with respect to this asymmetric
loss. A typical classifier will pick a threshold per group and set Ŷ = 1 for people with FICO
scores above the threshold for their group. Given the marginal distributions for each group
(Figure 7), we can study the optimal profit-maximizing classifier under five different constraints
on allowed predictors:
• Max profit has no fairness constraints, and will pick for each group the threshold that
maximizes profit. This is the score at which 82% of people in that group do not default.
• Race blind requires the threshold to be the same for each group. Hence it will pick the
single threshold at which 82% of people do not default overall, shown in Figure 8.
• Demographic parity picks for each group a threshold such that the fraction of group
members that qualify for loans is the same.
• Equal opportunity picks for each group a threshold such that the fraction of non-defaulting
group members that qualify for loans is the same.
1http://www.creditscoring.com/pages/bar.htm (Accessed: 2016-09-20)
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Figure 8: The common FICO threshold of 620 corresponds to a non-default rate of 82%.
Rescaling the x axis to represent the within-group thresholds (right), Pr[Ŷ = 1 | Y = 1,A] is the
fraction of the area under the curve that is shaded. This means black non-defaulters are much
less likely to qualify for loans than white or Asian ones, so a race blind score threshold violates
our fairness definitions.
• Equalized odds requires both the fraction of non-defaulters that qualify for loans and the
fraction of defaulters that qualify for loans to be constant across groups. This cannot be
achieved with a single threshold for each group, but requires randomization. There are
many ways to do it; here, we pick two thresholds for each group, so above both thresholds
people always qualify and between the thresholds people qualify with some probability.
We could generalize the above constraints to allow non-threshold classifiers, but we can show
that each profit-maximizing classifier will use thresholds. As shown in Section 4, the optimal
thresholds can be computed efficiently; the results are shown in Figure 9. Our proposed
fairness definitions give thresholds between those of max-profit/race-blind thresholds and of
demographic parity. Figure 10 plots the ROC curves for each group. It should be emphasized
that differences in the ROC curve do not indicate differences in default behavior but rather
differences in prediction accuracy—lower curves indicate FICO scores are less predictive for
those populations. This demonstrates, as one should expect, that the majority (white) group is
classified more accurately than minority groups, even over-represented minority groups like
Asians.
The left side of Figure 11 shows the fraction of people that wouldn’t default that would
qualify for loans by the various metrics. Under max-profit and race-blind thresholds, we find
that black people that would not default have a significantly harder time qualifying for loans
than others. Under demographic parity, the situation is reversed.
The right side of Figure 11 gives the profit achieved by each method, as a fraction of the
max profit achievable. We show this as a function of the non-default rate above which loans
are profitable (i.e. 82% in the other figures). At 82%, we find that a race blind threshold gets
99.3% of the maximal profit, equal opportunity gets 92.8%, equalized odds gets 80.2%, and
demographic parity gets 69.8%. So equal opportunity fairness costs less than a quarter what
demographic parity costs—and if the classifier improves, this would reduce further.
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Figure 9: FICO thresholds for various definitions of fairness. The equal odds method does not
give a single threshold, but instead Pr[Ŷ = 1 | R,A] increases over some not uniquely defined
range; we pick the one containing the fewest people. Observe that, within each race, the equal
opportunity threshold and average equal odds threshold lie between the max profit threshold
and equal demography thresholds.
The difference between equal odds and equal opportunity is that under equal opportunity,
the classifier can make use of its better accuracy among whites. Under equal odds this is viewed
as unfair, since it means that white people who wouldn’t pay their loans have a harder time
getting them than minorities who wouldn’t pay their loans. An equal odds classifier must
classify everyone as poorly as the hardest group, which is why it costs over twice as much in
this case. This also leads to more conservative lending, so it is slightly harder for non-defaulters
of all groups to get loans.
The equal opportunity classifier does make it easier for defaulters to get loans if they are
minorities, but the incentives are aligned properly. Under max profit, a small group may not be
worth figuring out how to classify and so be treated poorly, since the classifier can’t identify
the qualified individuals. Under equal opportunity, such poorly-classified groups are instead
treated better than well-classified groups. The cost is thus born by the company using the
classifier, which can decide to invest in better classification, rather than the classified group,
which cannot. Equalized odds gives a similar, but much stronger, incentive since the cost for a
small group is not proportional to its size.
While race blindness achieves high profit, the fairness guarantee is quite weak. As with
max profit, small groups may be classified poorly and so treated poorly, and the company has
little incentive to improve the accuracy. Furthermore, when race is redundantly encoded, race
blindness degenerates into max profit.
8 Conclusions
We proposed a fairness measure that accomplishes two important desiderata. First, it remedies
the main conceptual shortcomings of demographic parity as a fairness notion. Second, it is fully
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Figure 10: The ROC curve for using FICO score to identify non-defaulters. Within a group, we
can achieve any convex combination of these outcomes. Equality of opportunity picks points
along the same horizontal line. Equal odds picks a point below all lines.
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Figure 11: On the left, we see the fraction of non-defaulters that would get loans. On the right,
we see the profit achievable for each notion of fairness, as a function of the false positive/negative
trade-off.
aligned with the central goal of supervised machine learning, that is, to build higher accuracy
classifiers. In light of our results, we draw several conclusions aimed to help interpret and apply
our framework effectively.
Choose reliable target variables. Our notion requires access to observed outcomes such as
default rates in the loan setting. This is precisely the same requirement that supervised learning
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generally has. The broad success of supervised learning demonstrates that this requirement is
met in many important applications. That said, having access to reliable “labeled data” is not
always possible. Moreover, the measurement of the target variable might in itself be unreliable
or biased. Domain-specific scrutiny is required in defining and collecting a reliable target
variable.
Measuring unfairness, rather than proving fairness. Due to the limitations we described,
satisfying our notion (or any other oblivious measure) should not be considered a conclusive
proof of fairness. Similarly, violations of our condition are not meant to be a proof of unfairness.
Rather we envision our framework as providing a reasonable way of discovering and measuring
potential concerns that require further scrutiny. We believe that resolving fairness concerns is
ultimately impossible without substantial domain-specific investigation. This realization echoes
earlier findings in “Fairness through Awareness” [DHP+12] describing the task-specific nature
of fairness.
Incentives. Requiring equalized odds creates an incentive structure for the entity building the
predictor that aligns well with achieving fairness. Achieving better prediction with equalized
odds requires collecting features that more directly capture the target Y , unrelated to its
correlation with the protected attribute. Deriving an equalized odds predictor from a score
involves considering the pointwise minimum ROC curve among different protected groups,
encouraging constructing of predictors that are accurate in all groups, e.g., by collecting data
appropriately or basing prediction on features predictive in all groups.
When to use our post-processing step. An important feature of our notion is that it can
be achieved via a simple and efficient post-processing step. In fact, this step requires only
aggregate information about the data and therefore could even be carried out in a privacy-
preserving manner (formally, via Differential Privacy). In contrast, many other approaches
require changing a usually complex machine learning training pipeline, or require access to raw
data. Despite its simplicity, our post-processing step exhibits a strong optimality principle. If
the underlying score was close to optimal, then the derived predictor will be close to optimal
among all predictors satisfying our definition. However, this does not mean that the predictor
is necessarily good in an absolute sense. It also does not mean that the loss compared to the
original predictor is always small. An alternative to using our post-processing step is always
to invest in better features and more data. Only when this is no longer an option, should our
post-processing step be applied.
Predictive affirmative action. In some situations, including Scenario II in Section 6, the
equalized odds predictor can be thought of as introducing some sort of affirmative action: the
optimally predictive score R∗ is shifted based on A. This shift compensates for the fact that,
due to uncertainty, the score is in a sense more biased then the target label (roughly, R∗ is more
correlated with A then Y is correlated with A). Informally speaking, our approach transfers
the burden of uncertainty from the protected class to the decision maker. We believe this is
a reasonable proposal, since it incentivizes the decision maker to invest additional resources
toward building a better model.
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